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1 Introduction
The nancial and economic crisis that started in 2008 has generated strong growth in
the unemployment rate in many countries of the OECD. More specically, the average
unemployment rate increased by 3 percentage points in OECD countries between 2007
and the rst quarter of 2010. The increase in the unemployment rate has been dramatic
in countries like Spain, where it rose from 8.3 % to 19 %.
These results have begun to encourage important debates at political and academic
level on possible reforms of the labor market in the OECD countries most a¤ected by
this problem. It has been suggested to modify the system of wage negotiation in those
countries characterized by wage bargaining at sector level to models of negotiation that
generate higher wage moderation that can give rise to employment. These proposals are
based on the seminal article by Calmfors and Dri¢ ll (1988), where the worst result, in
terms of employment, was obtained in a model where the wage was negotiated at the
sector level.
In this context, our article considers a wide range of variables at the moment of wage
negotiation that do not appear in Calmfors and Dri¢ ll (1988), paying special attention
to the role that market power has on producing higher unemployment when the wage is
set at sector level. Moreover, we consider the e¤ects that the unemployment rate has on
long-term economic growth.
We match the static disequilibrium unemployment model without labor market fric-
tions in a monopolistic competition set up ( Arnsperger and De la Croix (1990), Layard,
Nickell and Jackman (1991), Dutt and Sen (1997), Blanchard and Giavazzi (2003), Spector
(2004)), with the innite horizon model of growth (see Galí (1996) for the full employment
version). We compare the wages set at the rm, sector and national (centralized) levels,
their unemployment rates and growth in economic variables for the Cobb-Douglas produc-
tion function in order to see under which conditions the inverse U hypothesis between the
unemployment rate and the degree of centralization, postulated by Calmfors and Dri¢ ll
(1988), holds for the unemployment rate and other variables.
We use the monopolistic competition set up because it is the natural framework for
di¤erent labor demand elasticities with respect to the real wage when wages are set at the
rm, sector and national (wage set for all sectors together) levels, the elasticity is greater
at sector level than rm and centralized levels. This is because the e¤ect of the wage on
prices is only taken into account at sector level. This higher elasticity, combined with other
variables, will normally produce higher wages and, ceteris paribus, a lower employment
rate at the sector level.
The existence and consideration of product market power is the reason that usually
produces the inverse U hypothesis in this paper. The idea that changing from sector to
centralized level results in a decrease in labor demand elasticity appears in Layard, Nickell
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and Jackman (1991), but they also justify the existence of full employment when wages
are set at the national level. We upgrade the Layard, Nickell and Jackman set up by
adding rm level wage setting and, more importantly, by introducing other institutional
characteristics that also a¤ect wage determination, such as the size and structure of social
expenditures, public sector ine¢ ciencies, the degree of internalization of the contribution
of labor income to the provision of social services and labor taxes. From a theoretical point
of view, it is interesting to analyze under what circumstances these variables may change
the inverse U e¤ect, due to the di¤erent labor demand elasticities, and full employment at
national level. Nevertheless, the important point is that, as we will see in the next section,
the values of some of the institutional variables that we introduce in the model are really
di¤erent across countries. This means that trying to check the inverse U hypothesis by
looking only at the level of centralization, without controlling for all the other variables,
may result in the inverse U hypothesis not appearing in the data. Finally, the introduction
of growth allows us to check whether the inverse U hypothesis holds for other variables.
The market power explanation for the inverse U form is di¤erent from the original
one given by Calmfors and Dri¢ ll because there is no market power in their model. The
inverse U form arises because of the assumption that, as centralization increases, the goods
produced by sectors whose unions set the wage together are closer substitutes.
There is another paper that combines monopolistic competition, (non frictional) un-
employment and growth. Brauninger (2000) presents an OLG growth model with mo-
nopolistic competition, Cobb-Douglas production function, unemployment, wages set at
sector level and a rule (constant replacement rate) that implies a constant employment
rate. The paper analyzes how unemployment a¤ects income per capita in the long run.
There are more papers that combine perfect competition, (non frictional) unemploy-
ment and growth: Daveri and Tabellini (2000) present an OLG growth model with perfect
competition, Cobb-Douglas production function, unemployment, wages set at national
level and the rule that implies a constant employment rate. They analyze how labor
taxes a¤ect employment and long run growth when there is an externality in produc-
tion. Doménech and García (2008), using an IH growth model, introduce the institutional
characteristics presented in this paper and analyze how they a¤ect the employment rate.
All these papers make assumptions that imply a constant unemployment rate derived
via the wage equation. The di¤erent assumptions used are discussed in Raurich and Sorolla
(2008) and, because of the use of the wage equation, the constant unemployment rate is
neutral with respect to changes in capital and total factor productivity. All these papers
also use a Cobb-Douglas production function. Kaas and von Thadden (2003) present an
OLG growth model with perfect competition, disequilibrium unemployment and a CES
production function. The change of production function results in constant real wages and
a capital labor ratio instead of a constant employment rate.
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Our results show that a high degree of market power produces the inverse U form for
unemployment postulated by Calmfors and Dri¢ ll (1988), but they also illustrate that an
increase in employment is possible considering, alternatively, other types of reforms in the
labor market. This is because the unemployment rate depends on a complex sample of
variables, one of which corresponds to the system of wage negotiation.
The paper is structured as follows: In section 2 we present the stylized facts concerning
some variables that appear in the model. Section 3 derives labor demand with monopolistic
competition. Section 4 introduces the government budget constraint. Section 5 derives the
wage set at the sector level and Section 6 the employment rate at the rm and sector levels.
Section 7 computes the wage and employment at national level and section 8 includes the
growth equations and results. The paper concludes with a summary of the main results.
2 The stylized facts for some OECD countries.
Many of the articles that have been written in the last few decades about unemployment
focus on explaining the substantial di¤erences in the level and evolution of the unem-
ployment rate across OECD countries. The poor performance of the unemployment rate
is explained by shocks and di¤erences in institutions or the interaction of both1. It is
important to note that the collective bargaining system appears as a key element in all
these explanations . As pointed out by Calmfors and Dri¢ ll (1988), highly centralized (at
national or multi-industry level) and decentralized (at the rm level) bargaining systems
perform better than intermediate ones (at the sector/industry level) on wage demands. At
rm level, the competitive pressure from other rms in the same industry (producing closer
substitutes) provides strong incentives to moderate wage demands. At national level, the
central union federation will internalize externalities that would be ignored by negotiators
in decentralized bargaining structures. Consequently, it is predicted that more centralized
collective bargaining arrangements will produce lower wage demands and unemployment
rates.
This paper explores from a theoretical point of view the link between the unemployment
and economic growth rates with the collective bargaining systems at the rm, industry
and national levels. Nevertheless, our analysis is deeper because we add other institutional
features, rigidities and macroeconomic parameters that also a¤ect wage bargaining. We
include the size and structure of social expenditures, public sector ine¢ ciencies, the labor
force participation rate, labor taxes and the degree of competition of the output market.
We show that the employment rate depends on all these variables together, which means
that empirical research based only on changes in one variable usually yields poor results.
When one analyzes, for example, the inuence of taxes on unemployment it seems that
1An excellent survey on these issues can be found in Blanchard (2006).
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other elements must be taken into account in order to explain the data. The empirical
evidence presented by Daveri and Tabellini (2000) supports the view that in more corporate
and decentralized countries, labor taxes are less distortionary than in countries with an
intermediate level of wage bargaining.
Taking into account a broader set of variables than the wage bargaining system o¤ers
an explanation for the lack of robustness of the hump-shaped curve predicted by Calforms
and Dri¢ ll (1988)2. The group of countries that belong to a certain wage bargaining
system may di¤er in the composition of labor taxes, the ine¢ ciency of their governments,
the degree of competition in the goods market, etc.. and all these variables also a¤ect
wage determination. However, as we will see, some characteristics are correlated, which
sometimes implies good results without considering all variables.
Table 1 presents the classication of many OECD countries by their wage negotiation
system in three groups that we have named ANGLO, EUCON and NORDIC. For this
country classication we use the product of bargaining level, union density and bargaining
coordination relative to the value for Finland3.
2See Aidt and Tzanatos (2008), for a excellent survey of these issues.
3Source: Database Nickell (2006).
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Table 1
Some labour markets institutional indicators in OECD countries
Bargaining Union Coordination Relative
level Coverage Product
ANGLO
USA 1 0.2 1 0.02
Canada 1.1 0.37 1.3 0.04
Japan 1 0.23 4 0.08
UK 1.3 0.57 1.8 0.12
New Zealand 1.6 0.5 3 0.21
EUCON
France 2 0.91 2 0.32
Switzerland 1.8 0.52 4 0.33
Greece 2 0.9 3 0.47
Australia 2 0.83 3.4 0.50
Italy 2.4 0.84 2.8 0.5
Denmark 2.3 0.72 4 0.58
Netherlands 2.1 0.8 4 0.59
Spain 2.5 0.75 3.7 0.61
Germany 2 0.87 4 0.61
Belgium 2 0.89 4 0.62
Portugal 2.5 0.75 3.8 0.63
Ireland 2.5 0.9 3.2 0.63
NORDIC
Sweden 2.48 0.87 3.4 0.64
Norway 2.6 0.7 4.3 0.69
Austria 2 0.96 4.4 0.74
Finland 2.5 0.95 4.8 1
Source: Database Nickell (2006).
In Tables 2 and 3 we add an average value of di¤erent institutional indicators and
rigidities for the period 1998-2008 . The theoretical study below investigates more closely
the mechanism through which the variables that reect the institutional framework a¤ect
the unemployment rate.
In Tables 2 and 3 we add an average value of di¤erent institutional indicators and
rigidities for the period 1998-2008. The theoretical study below investigates more closely
the mechanism through which the variables that reect the institutional framework a¤ect
the unemployment rate.
The rst variable presented in Table 2 is the harmonized unemployment rate from
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OECD statistical (U). Column 2 shows the degree of e¢ ciency of the public sector (GE)4.
This variable was been constructed by Kaufmann et. al. (2009). These authors dene
government e¢ ciency as an aggregate governance indicator that measures perceptions of
the quality of public service provision, the quality of the bureaucracy and the competence
of civil servants among other elements related to the government. This variable is relevant
for wage determination when the government nances a given level of social expenditure.
The more ine¢ cient the government is the higher the tax rates necessary to nance a given
government expenditure and, therefore, the greater the e¤ects on employment.
Column 3 shows the degree of rigidity in the goods market (PMR)5. Many authors stress
the relationship between rigidities in the goods markets and wage setting6.When the price
elasticity of goodsdemand is high, rms have more market power and the elasticity of
labor demand with respect to wages is also high and workers ask for a higher wage. Thus,
although product market competition is assumed to not have a direct inuence on union
bargaining power, it does have an indirect impact through the elasticity of labor demand
and thereby on the resulting wage rate.
Finally, Column 4 of Table 2 shows the average labor force participation rate elaborated
by the OECD (LBPR) that we assume a¤ects the amount of social services that an active
worker receives.
4See Doménech and García (2008) for an in-depth discussion of this variable.
5The indicator of product market regulations (PMR) is dened in Conway et. al. (2005). The source
of the database is the webpage http:www.oecd.org/eco/pmr.
6For a more detailed discussion of these issues see, for instance, Nickell (1999), Boeri et.al (2000),
Blanchard and Giavazzi (2003) and OECD (2002) chapter ve.
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Table 2
Rigidities and institutions
U GE PMR LBPR
ANGLO
USA 4.98 1.74 1.04 78.78
Canada 7.05 2.01 1.13 78.59
Japan 4.57 1.27 1.57 78.69
UK 5.30 1.86 0.91 77.72
New Zealand 5.12 1.86 1.25 78.41
average 5.41 1.75 1.18 78.44
std desv 0.96 0.28 0.25 0.42
EUCON
France 9.12 1.54 1.91 69.05
Switzerland 3.55 2.18 1.79 83.27
Greece 10.04 0.71 2.63 66.28
Australia 5.80 1.93 1.30 76.08
Italy 8.55 0.73 1.93 62.38
Denmark 4.55 2.17 1.28 80.98
Netherlands 3.44 2 1.13 76.21
Spain 10.84 1.42 1.75 69.20
Germany 8.74 1.72 1.66 73.65
Belgium 7.89 1.76 1.73 65.43
Portugal 6.11 1.05 1.77 76.89
Ireland 4.99 1.67 1.31 70.11
average 6.97 1.57 1.68 72.46
std desv 2.55 0.51 0.4 6.43
NORDIC
Sweden 6.67 2.07 1.57 80.69
Norway 3.44 2.05 1.48 81.27
Austria: 4.29 1.83 1.85 72.94
Finland 8.79 2.09 1.52 75.48
average 5.80 2.01 1.61 77.60
std desv 2.42 0.12 0.17 4.05
Table 3, Column 1 shows social expenditures with respect to GDP (SE). These ex-
penditures are basically nanced by social security contributions paid by workers and
employers. Imposition on labor revenues and other taxes play a minor role (See OECD
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(2007))7. Thus, a very close relationship can be observed between the nancing of social
policy expenditure and the unemployment rate, through the social security contributions
in the labour market. Columns 2 to 5 report average tax wedges (TW), income tax (IT)
and employeesand employerssocial contributions (WSC and ESC respectively). The tax
wedge is computed as the sum of labor income tax, and social security contributions paid
by workers and employers8.
As can be seen from the Table 3, there are large di¤erences in the composition of the
tax wedge across OECD countries over the period 1988-2008. In general, countries with
the highest labor tax are also those that tend to have the highest social contributions paid
directly by employers.
The most striking results that emerge from the data for EUCON countries with respect
to the rest of countries are the following. For nancing social expenditures, we nd that
the social security contribution paid by employers (Table 3 ESC) in some countries is
prominent (e.g. France, Italy and Spain). Another relevant fact is that, on average, they
are the most ine¢ cient (Table 2, GE average 1.57), have a more regulated goods market
(Table 2, PMR average 1.68) and the lowest labor participation rate (Table 2, LBPR
average 72.46). These three characteristics are important, since they interrelate with the
imposition on the labor market and, therefore, with unemployment. Unfortunately, these
series are relatively recent and it is not possible to obtain a longer sample period that
allows regressions to be performed. These factors may explain the relatively good/poor
empirical estimations found by di¤erent authors over time.
7Only Australia, Denmark and N. Zealand do not nance social policy expenditure with social security
contributions.
8All the e¤ective tax rates have been computed, as suggested in Boscá, García and Taguas (2005),
using the methodology proposed by Mendoza et. al (1994).
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Table 3
Social expenditure and the tax structure
SE TW IT WSC ESC
ANGLO
USA 15.36 0.25 0.13 0.06 0.06
Canada 16.91 0.30 0.20 0.04 0.06
Japan 17.28 0.24 0.07 0.08 0.09
UK 20.07 0.27 0.14 0.05 0.07
New Zealand 18.92 0.21 0.21 0.0 0.0
average 17.71 0.25 0.15 0.05 0.06
std desv 1.83 0.03 0.06 0.03 0.03
EUCON
France 28.68 0.49 0.12 0.10 0.27
Switzerland 19.20 0.24 0.13 0.06 0.06
Greece 19.71 0.39 0.07 0.15 0.18
Australia 17.40 0.18 0.18 0.0 0.0
Italy 23.88 0.51 0.16 0.07 0.27
Denmark 26.81 0.40 0.38 0.02 0.0
Netherlands 20.61 0.34 0.10 0.15 0.1
Spain 20.62 0.38 0.11 0.05 0.22
Germany 26.59 0.41 0.12 0.14 0.15
Belgium 26.12 0.51 0.21 0.10 0.2
Portugal 20.41 0.33 0.09 0.08 0.16
Ireland 14.9 0.27 0.17 0.04 0.07
average 22.08 0.37 0.15 0.08 0.14
std desv 4.27 0.1 0.08 0.05 0.1
NORDIC
Sweden 29.60 0.58 0.28 0.06 0.23
Norway 22.67 0.43 0.2 0.08 0.14
Austria: 26.93 0.45 0.15 0.14 0.16
Finland 25.42 0.55 0.27 0.06 0.23
average 26.23 0.5 0.23 0.08 0.19
std desv 2.78 0.07 0.06 0.04 0.05
The stylized facts presented above suggest that the Eucon countries have the insti-
tutional characteristics that can generate a higher unemployment rate than the rest of
countries. Table 4 presents the simple correlation using cross-country data between all
relevant variables over the period 1988-2008. Since a correlation does not imply in any
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sense causality, the existence of signicant correlation suggests that the mechanism relat-
ing the variables to labor market performance is not so simple. Table 4 shows that the tax
rates paid by employers seem to be positively related to the unemployment rate (0.663).
At the same time, there is a positive correlation between government e¢ ciency and the
labor force participation rates in OECD countries (0.676). It is interesting to notice that
there is a strong negative correlation between government e¢ ciency and the product mar-
ket regulation (-0.636). Finally, social expenditure and tax paid by employers are highly
correlated (0.613). All these correlations led us to consider a theoretical framework, in the
next sections, in which all these variables appear and determine the unemployment rate.
Table 4
Correlations between institutions and social expenditure
GE LBPR PMR SE TW ESC
U -0.503* -0.684** 0.546* 0.29 0.469* 0.663**
GE 0.676** -0.636** 0.136 -0.065 -0.434*
LBPR -0.561** -0.168 -0.393 -0.601**
PMR 0.337 0.442* 0.613**
SE 0.860** 0.607**
TW 0.831**
** The correlation is signicant at 0.01 level
** The correlation is signicant at 0.01 level
3 Labor demand in sector j with monopolistic com-
petition in the goods market
We assume J 2 [0; 1] sectors with one rm per sector that produces a di¤erent good, Yj (t),
using the same production Cobb Douglas technology, that is:
Yj (t) = AKj (t)
 Lj (t)
1  . (1)
The demand function facing rm J is
Yj(t) =

Pj(t)
P (t)
   
Y(t)

, (2)
where  > 1 is the constant elasticity of demand of product J with respect to its price,
Y(t)  Y (t)
P (t)
is total real expenditures on consumption and investment, Pj(t) is price of
product j, P (t) is a price index with the habitual properties and Yj(t) is the corresponding
quantity demanded of the consumption and investment good produced by rm j 9.
9For more details see Appendix A.
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The rm in sector j maximizes the wealth of its shareholders subject to the demand
function (2). Each rm pays a payroll tax,  f , in order to nance social services. The rst
order condition in terms of the real wage 10 is:
(1  )AKj L j A 
1
K
 

j L
  1  
j =
(1 +  f )m!j
Y(t)
1

, (3)
where the parameterm represent the monopoly degree or the (price) markupm  1
(1  1

)
=
1 and !j(t)  Wj(t)P (t) is the real wage in sector j:
The labor demand, in terms of the real wage, is, then:
Ldj (t) =
~Ldj (!j(t)) = A
 1
1+( 1)K(t)
( 1)
1+( 1) Y(t)
1
1+( 1) (m
(1 +  f )
(1  ) !j(t))
 
1+( 1) , (4)
where the elasticity of the labor demand with respect to the wage is constant and given
by:
"Ldj ;!j 
@ ~Ldj (!j)
@!j
!j
~Ldj (!j)
=
 
1 + (   1) =
 1
+ (1 )

. (5)
Note that the elasticity of labor demand depends positively on the product market elas-
ticity  with the property that the greater the  the lower "Ldj ;!j and always "Ldj ;!j <  1,
meaning that an increase in the real wage always decreases the wage bill !j ~Ldj (!j). In the
case of perfect competition we have  =1 and elasticity is equal to   1

11.
4 Government budget constraint
Before describing wage bargaining, we need to introduce the government budget constraint.
The government nances the unemployment benets paid to unemployed workers and
social services. To generate revenue, at each period t the government imposes a at-rate
tax. More specically, L denotes the tax rate paid by employees on wages. This tax
includes income tax plus the social security contribution paid by employees.
We assume that given a level of taxes collected, more ine¢ cient governments will
produce a lower level of transfers and social services. It can be assumed that this level
of ine¢ ciency will be proportional to the administrative cost of managing tax revenues.
10This expression comes from equation (50) in the appendix.
11Alternatively, forcing the model because we assume only one rm per sector, we can consider the
perfect competition situation the case where the rm takes Pj(t) as given. Then, the rst order condition
in terms of Wj(t)Pj(t) is FL =
 
1 + f
 Wj(t)
Pj(t)
, labor demand is: Ldj = ~L
d
j (
Wj
Pj
) =
 
(1 )A
(1+f )
Wj
Pj
! 1

Kj and the
elasticity with respect to Wj(t)Pj(t) , "Ldj ;(
Wj
Pj
)
=   1 .
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The parameter  stands for the level of ine¢ ciency of the government to nance its public
expenditure12. From all this, it follows that the governments ow budget constraint in
real terms is:
(1 + ) (S(t) + (N(t)  L(t))B(t)) =  L +  f!(t)L(t), (6)
where S(t) are social services in real terms, B(t) the unemployment benet in real
terms and N(t) the inelastic labor supply (active population).
We assume, that a part of the tax revenues is used to nance social services (such
as education, social security system, pensions etc.) and another part is channelled to
nancing the unemployment benets of unemployed workers in each period, so that the
following equalities hold:
(1 + )S(t) = 
 
L +  f

!(t)L(t), (7)
(1 + )B(t)(N(t)  L(t)) = (1  )  L +  f!(t)L(t), (8)
where the parameter  captures the relative weight of the expense in social services decided
by the government with respect to tax revenues. Rewriting the last two equations we get:
S(t) = 
 
L +  f

!(t)L(t)
(1 + )
(9)
and
B(t) = (1  )
 
L +  f

!(t)L(t)
(1 + )(N(t)  L(t)) . (10)
Note that, because we assume Land  f are invariant, the last two equations imply
that an increase in the wage always reduce S(t)and B(t), when employment is given by
labor demand, because its elasticity with respect to the real wage is less than 1.
We include the level of public services, S(t), in the utility function of trade unions,
reecting the fact that the welfare of workers depends on the level of social services they
receive13. If we add equation (9), we also assume that workers have perceptions about
how changes in the wage a¤ect the amount of public services.
12A similar assumption is made by Doménech and García (2008).
13For a more extensive discussion, see Mares (2004).
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5 Wage setting at the sector level
We assume that the basic theoretical structure takes into account a three-stage game.
In the rst stage, the rms decide the level of capital stocks anticipating their e¤ects
on wage setting and labor demand. In stage two, the wage rate is determined through a
process of bargaining between employers and trade unions. Finally, in stage three, the rm
unilaterally determines the employment level once the conditions of the wage negotiations
and investment decisions have been settled.14
It is assumed that the labor force is completely unionized. There are J unions (one
for each industry) whose objective is to maximize the income of a worker working in
the sector with respect to the alternative income of working outside the sector, Rj(t),
times employment. Additionally, we assume that the union takes into account that social
services a¤ect the welfare of workers and that the revenues obtained from the wage bill of
the sector may contribute to nance social services15. The specication of the j th union
utility function is given by
Vj =

(1  L)!j(t) Rj(t)

Ldj (t) + s
(L +  f )!j(t)L
d
j (t)
(1 + )
. (11)
We introduce the parameter s which measures the ability of the trade union in sector
j to internalize the contribution of the wage bill in sector j, !jLdj , to the provision of
social services. It is reasonable to assume that this parameter is determined by two
factors. The rst is the degree of centralization of wage bargaining. There has been some
consensus in recent literature on the importance of the degree of centralization of wage
bargaining system on the unemployment rate. It is very usual in the literature to classify
wage setting regimes by their degree of centralization into three types. Highly centralized
systems, such as national level bargaining, intermediate levels of centralization, where
the bargaining process is carried out at industry level and, nally, negotiation at the
rm level. We assume that the degree of internalization  is positively related with the
level of centralization of wage bargaining. The second factor that will a¤ect the value of
parameter  is the share of active labor force with respect to the inactive population in the
economy. We suppose that the same level of social services is available to the labor force
and the inactive population. Note that the social services for the non active population are
nanced by taxes levied on the active population. Therefore, if the unions care only about
the social services of the active population, the higher the inactive population receiving
social services, the lower the ability of trade unions to internalize the provision of services
and the lower the value of parameter s16. We also assume that the union considers no
14For a more details over this issue see, for example, Koskela et. al (2009)
15Details of these hypotheses are given in Mares (2004).
16In a more formalized way: our active population is N(t) and total population P (t) = (1 + )N(t).
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e¤ect of the wage bill in sector j on alternative income because, although it is true that the
wage will nance the unemployment benet in this sector, the weight of the unemployment
benet on alternative income is small, because it is also comprises the wages of all the
other sectors.
Turning to wage bargaining, we assume that employers negotiate the sector wage with
the trade union taking into account that rms retain their right-to-manage power and
determine employment (and capital) after the wage has been set. The outcome of wage
bargaining is determined by the Nash-bargaining solution, which maximizes the Nash
product (Vj)
  j   j1  : Where  denotes the bargaining power of the trade union.
The fall-back position for the rm is given by j =  rtKj:
For an interior solution, the maximization of the logarithm of the generalized Nash
criterion gives the rst order condition:

Vj!
Vj
+ (1  )
 
j   j

! 
j   j
 = 0, (12)
where
Vj!
Vj
= 
"
Ldj +
@Ldj
@!j
!j
# 
(1  L) + (
L +  f )
(1 + )

  Rj
@Ldj
@!j
(13)
and
(1  )
 
j   j

! 
j   j
 = (1  ) 1
!j (m(1  )  1) . (14)
Substituting expressions (13) and (14) into the rst-order condition (12) yield, after some
rearrangement, the following Nash bargaining solution for the wage rate set by union J
!j(t) =

(1  ) +  m
1 
h
(1  L) + s (L+f )(1+)
iRj(t). (15)
Note that in this case an increase in market power increases the wage as emphasized
by Layard, Nickell and Jackman (1991) (P. 27) and Spector (2004). Note also that an
increase in ,  and  f produces wage moderation and an increase in Land  an increase
in wage demands.
If the rm behaves competitively we have, on the one hand, m = 1, which gives the
labor demand elasticity   1

; on the other hand, we assume the internalization parameter 
to be zero because there are many rms and many sectors, the wage bill of one rm being
negligible in regard to the total wage bill that nances social services. Then the wage is:
Then social services per person are S(t)P (t) and the social services of active population, the term that enters
in utility function of the union, S(t)P (t)N(t) =
S(t)
(1+) .
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!f (t) =

(1  ) +  1
1 

(1  L) Rj(t), (16)
having that !f (t) < !j(t) ifm is high enough (m > 1+

(1  ) +  1
1 
 (1 )
(1 L)s
(L+f )
(1+)
):
This is because the positive e¤ect of the reduction in monopoly power will dominate
the negative e¤ect of the elimination of the internalization parameter and, then, there will
be wage restraint. If we interpret the wage set in the competitive case as wage setting at
rm level, because the union takes into account the labor demand of a small competitive
rm17, then we will have wage restraint at rm level.
6 The alternative income and the constant employ-
ment rate at the rm and sector level.
In the short run partial equilibrium presented above, the wage bargaining process takes
the alternative income of working outside the sector (or the rm) as given. Nevertheless,
in the short run general equilibrium, all sectors set the same price and wages in all rms
and sectors are set in a similar way. As a result R(t) becomes endogenous. In this model
we assume that the alternative income a worker gets if he does not work in rm or sector
j is given by18
Rj(t) = l(t)(1  L(t))!e(t) + (1  l(t))B(t); (17)
where l(t) is the employment rate of the economy i.e. l(t)  L(t)
N(t)
, where L(t) =
min(Ld(t); N(t)) and Ld(t) =
1Z
0
Ldj (t)dj, !
e(t) is the alternative wage of working outside
(rm) sector j and B(t) is the unemployment benet that an unemployed worker gets.
In a symmetric equilibrium !j(t) = !e(t) = !(t). We assume that the unemployment
benet is nanced by the employed workers revenues and determined by the budget
constraint of the government once it has decided the constant tax rates, then from (10),
it is:
B(t) =
(1  )
(1 + )
(L +  f )!(t)l(t)
(1  l(t)) , (18)
taking into account that !e(t) = !(t) and combining equations (15), (17) and (18) we
obtain:
17In this case the utility function of the union would be Vf;j =
h
(1  L)WjP  Rj
i
~Ldj (
Wj
Pj
)
where the union chooses Wj , and, one can show that the solution is the above expression.
18In a similar way Romer (2006) p.454 assumes: Rt = (1  but)!t.
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!(t) = !(t)l(t)

(1  ) +  m
1  
 h(1  L) + (1  ) (L+f )
(1+)
i
h
(1  L) + s (L+f )(1+)
i . (19)
And the employment rate when wages are set at the sector level is:
l(t) =
h
(1  L) + s (L+f )(1+)
i

(1  ) +  m
1 
 h
(1  L) + (1  ) (L+f )
(1+)
i = lSL. (20)
This means that the wage equation plus the unemployment benet budget constraint
equation gives, for the Cobb-Douglas production function, a constant employment rate.
We can nd a similar expression for a constant employment rate derived via a wage equa-
tion plus an unemployment benet budget constraint equation in a monopolistic competi-
tion set up with a Cobb-Douglas production function and where wages are set at national
level (see next section) in Braüninger (2000). Layard, Nickell and Jackman (1991) P. 27
also derive a constant unemployment rate using a wage equation plus a constant exogenous
replacement rate B
!
. There are other ways of obtaining constant employment rates: with
perfect competition and a Cobb-Douglas production function, Daveri and Tabellini (2000)
assume B(t) =  Y (t)
L(t)
and Doménech and García (2008) do the same. Raurich and Sorolla
(2008) discuss di¤erent ways of obtaining a constant employment rate when the wage is a
mark-up over the reservation wage. This constant unemployment rate depends crucially
on the use of (10), which, as we said before, means that wage increases produce a reduction
in the unemployment benet19. Papers that assume a constant unemployment benet are,
for example, Pissarides (1998) but in our opinion this assumption in an economy with
growth is worse that assuming constant taxes.
Looking at lSL it is easy to see that there is unemployment when wages are set at
the sector level m is high enough or s is low enough, that is, higher monopoly power
or a lower proportion of social services or lower perceptions produce unemployment. Note
@ls
@m
< 0 and that neither changes in capital K nor total factor productivity A a¤ect
employment, that is capital and productivity are neutral with respect to unemployment
or growth does not a¤ect employment. The reason is that with this wage setting rule an
increase in Kor A decreases unemployment, but then the unemployment benet increases
and also the wage, completely crowding out the positive e¤ect of Kor A on labor demand.
Koskela, Stenbacka and Juselius (2009) with a particular production function obtain an
employment rate that depends on capital. There is also empirical evidence that K a¤ects
employment on the short run (Karanassou et. al. (2008) and Driver and Muñoz-Bugarin
(2009)).
19One may argue that real governments do not reduce the unemployment benet when unemployment
increases, but, as we said, a similar result is obtained using B(t) =  Y (t)L(t) :
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We can explore the e¤ect of the weight of social services , the imposition on the
employee L and  f on the employment rate. The di¤erentiation of the employment rate
(20) with respect to  yields a positive relationship. The e¤ect of the imposition on
employment in both cases depends on the sign of the following expression [s  (1  )] :
More specically, @l
@L
> 0 and @l
@f
> 0 when s >
1 

: Our ndings concerning the
determinants of unemployment, under short run general equilibrium, show the importance
of the relationship between the parameters of the model.
When the wage is set at the rm level, the employment rate is equal to
l(t) =
(1  L)
(1  ) +  1
1 
 h
(1  L) + (1  ) (L+f )
(1+)
i = lFL < 1 (21)
and there is always unemployment. Note that the employment rate does not depend on
m. This may seem strange because from (16), it is the wage what does not depend on m.
The explanation is that an increase in m does not initially change the wage and, via labor
demand, increases unemployment, but, if unemployment increases, the unemployment
benet is reduced, implying, via a wage equation, a decrease in the wage in such a way
that, nally, employment is not a¤ected. Note nally that, as we argued before, if m is
high enough, we will have a higher employment rate at rm level. This result gives the
condition for the rst part of the inverse U hypothesis to be true, if market power is high
enough the unemployment rate will be higher if wages are set at the sector level than if
they are set at the rm level. This fact is due to the higher wage set at sector level higher
elasticity of the labor demand to take into account the output demand function.
7 Wage setting at national level
Following Layard, Nickell and Jackman (1991), P.51, in a symmetric equilibrium Pj(t) =
P (t) for all j and then the aggregate price index is also P (t), thus the labor demand in
sector j becomes20:
FL(Kj(t); Lj(t)) = m(1 + 
f )
Wj(t)
P (t)
= (1 +  f )m!j(t),
moreover in this symmetric equilibriumKj(t) = K(t), Lj(t) = L(t) and then the aggregate
labor demand
1Z
0
Lj(t)dj is also Lj(t) and !j(t) = !(t). This means that aggregate labor
demand is given by the equation:
20This assumption implies that product demand and then market power disappears from the program
of the rm.
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FL(K(t); L(t)) = (1 + 
f )m!(t), (22)
expression that implies the aggregate labor demand function Ld(t) = ~Ld((1+ f )m!(t); K(t))
where ~L(1+f )m! < 0 and ~LK > 0:More specically, for the Cobb-Douglas production func-
tion aggregate labor demand is:
Ld(t) = (1  ) 1A 1 ((1 +  f )m!(t)) 1 K(t),
with elasticity with respect to the wage equal to   1

<  1, that also does not depend on
market power, m, as is the case when the rm acts competitively.
Now we assume that in a centralized wage setting system, the national union maximizes
the utility function given by
V = (1  L)!(t)L(t) + (N(t)  L(t))B(t) + n(
L +  f )!(t)L(t)
(1 + )
(23)
where
L(t) = min(N(t); Ld(t)).
We assume, as argued before, that n > s. It is easy to check that the solution
obtained from this program is the same as the one obtained if the national union also
maximizes (11) considering that the alternative income R(t) is the unemployment benet
B(t), because there is no alternative sector. Then the wage set by the national union is
!n(t) =

(1  ) +  1
1 
h
(1  L) + n (L+f )(1+)
iB(t). (24)
Note now that the wage markup over the alternative income is lower at the national
level than at the sector level because
(1  ) +  1
1 
h
(1  L) + n (L+f )(1+)
i < (1  ) +  m1 h
(1  L) + s (L+f )(1+)
i
due to the presence of the price markup in the sector level wage setting system, mod-
eration that is reinforced by the assumption that in the wage setting system the value of
 is higher.
Now considering (18) we have that the employment rate is:
l(t) =
h
(1  L) + n (L+f )(1+)
i
h
(1  L) + n (L+f )(1+)
i
+

(1  ) +  1
1 
 (1 )(L+f )
(1+)
= lNL. (25)
Note that as long as  < 1 then lNL < 1, that is there is always unemployment when
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wages are set in a centralized way. When  = 1 we have l(t) = 1, that is, if there are
only social expenditures and not unemployment benets the national union chooses the
competitive wage. This is because in this case the utility function of the union becomes:
V = (1  L)!(t)L(t) + n(
L +  f )!(t)L(t)
(1 + )
, (26)
and, as the elasticity of labor demand in this case is   1

<  1, an increase in the wage
reduces !(t)L(t) and the union chooses the competitive wage.
When  = 0, the employment rate is:
l(t) =
(1  L)
(1  L) + (1  ) +  1
1 
 (L+f )
(1+)
= lNL < 1 (27)
that means that when only unemployment benets are paid we have unemployment
when wages are set in a centralized way.
For having lNL > l

SL we need:
h
(1  L) + n (L+f )(1+)
i
h
(1  L) + n (L+f )(1+)
i
+

(1  ) +  1
1 

(1 )(L+f )
(1+)
(28)
>
h
(1  L) + s (L+f )(1+)
i

(1  ) +  m
1 
 h
(1  L) + (1  ) (L+f )
(1+)
i .
An educated look at this expression shows that the rst term is always greater than
the second one if m is high enough or s low enough, assuming all the other parameters
are equal. This means that for all the other parameters equal there is wage restraint at
national level if market power is high enough or the degree of internalization of the sector
union low enough. This may be surprising because we saw that the wage markup is always
lower when wages are set in a centralized way, but the reason is that alternative income
is di¤erent. Of course, when one considers di¤erent countries with di¤erent parameters
it may be the case that even if the degree of market power is high enough or the degree
of internalization of the sector union low enough there is more unemployment at national
level.
One may alternatively consider that the national union also has perceptions about how
the wage will a¤ect the unemployment benet in a similar way it considers it a¤ects social
expenditures. In this case, the national union believes that changing the wage, the wage
bill and the amount of employment will change and then also the unemployment benet
according to the equation:
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B(t) = '
(1  )
(1 + )
(L +  f )!(t)L(t)
(N(t)  L(t)) (29)
with 0 < ' 5 121. With a Cobb-Douglas utility function, this means that the union
now considers that an increase in the wage bill reduces the unemployment benet because
!(t)L(t) decreases and (N(t)   L(t)) increases. Now the utility function of the union
becomes:
VB = (1  L + ['(1  ) + n] (
L +  f )
(1 + )
)!(t)L(t) (30)
and in this case it is obvious that it chooses the competitive wage because the elasticity
with respect to the wage is equal to   1

and an increase in the wage always reduces the
wage bill !(t)L(t). In this case, therefore, there is full employment, that is, lNL;S = 1 and
lNL;S > l

S if m is high enough or s is low enough.
One may nally consider the opposite case: that in a centralized wage setting system
the national union also has perceptions about the e¤ect of wages on taxes. More specif-
ically, it may think that if the wage increases then the unemployment benet and the
tax rate on employers will remain invariant and then the tax rate on employed workers is
going to change. This means that, in this case, the national union now adds the following
restriction to its program:
L =

'
(1 + )S(t)(N(t)  L(t))
!(t)L(t)
   f

where 0 < ' 5 1 reects the unions belief about how changes in the unemployment
benet are going to a¤ect workerstaxes22. The case ' = 0, is the rst one presented in this
section and Layard, Nickell and Jackman (1991) on P. 130 consider the case ' =  = 1,
 =  =  f = 023. Now the objective function of the union becomes:
VL = (1 + 
f )!(t)L(t) + (1  '(1 + ) + ')S(t)(N(t)  L(t))
and for 0 < ' 5 1 the wage is:
!n;L(t) =
h
(1  ) +  (1 '(1+)+')
1 
i
(1 +  f )
B(t). (31)
Then the employment rate is:
21This is the case when the union considers, in part, exactly what the government does.
22The alternative assumption is that the union thinks that if the wage increases, then the tax rate will
remain invariant and, then, the unemployment benet is going to change according to s(t) = 1
(t)!(t)L(t)
(N(t) L(t)) .
In this case the objective funcion of the union becomes (1 +

1
   

)!(t)L(t)
23In this case, whatever the union considers is going to happen when employment changes, the objective
function of the union is !(t)L(t).
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l(t) =
(1 +  f )
(1 +  f ) +
h
(1  ) +  (1 '(1+)+')
1 
i = lNL;L . (32)
Note that in this case there is unemployment if the term '(1+ ) is low enough and in
the specic case consider by Layard, Nickell and Jackman (1991) we have full employment,
l(t) = 1.
In order to have lNL;L > l

SL we need:
(1 +  f )
(1 +  f ) +
h
(1  ) +  (1 '(1+)+')
1 
i >
h
(1  L) + s (L+f )(1+)
i

(1  ) +  m
1 
 h
(1  L) + (1  ) (L+f )
(1+)
i
(33)
and, again, lNL;L > l

S if m is high enough or s is low enough.
Therefore, obtaining unemployment or full employment in the centralized wage setting
system depends heavily on what the union assumes is going to happen when the wage it
sets increases. If it thinks that neither the unemployment benet nor taxes on employed
workers will change, then there is unemployment. If it thinks that an increase in the wage
will decrease the unemployment benet then we have full employment. If it thinks that
an increase in the wage will increase workerstaxes we have, in general, unemployment.
Note also that a higher degree of market power does not a¤ect any of the employment
rates obtained when wages are set at national level for the same reason as when they are
set at rm level.
In all three cases we have a higher employment rate when wages are set at national
level than when wages are set at sector level if m is high enough or s is low enough.
Hence, we should expect the inverse U relationship between unemployment and the degree
of centralization of wage setting when the degree of market power in the product market
is high enough. This is due to the higher labor demand elasticity at sector level because of
considering market power at this level. This argument is similar to Calmfors and Dri¢ ls
assumption that the elasticity of labor demand decreases with the degree of centralization,
but we have a strong argument for this assumption: the consideration of market power
when wages are set at the sector level.
Note nally, that this relationship occurs when all the other parameters do not change.
Therefore, it is not surprising that if one checks for the inverse U hypothesis without
controlling for the other parameters that a¤ect the employment rate, the relationship
does not appear.
22
8 Households and equilibrium
In the IH model we have a representative family with N(t) members growing at the
constant rate n, with an inelastic labor supply equal to N(t) that (see Galí (1996) section
2.1) chooses aggregate consumption per capita, c(t) 
1Z
0
cj(t)dj, where cj(t)  Cj(t)N(t) , in
order to maximize:
1Z
t=0
e ( n)t

c(t)1    1
1  

(34)
subject to:
_a(t) = (1  )w(t)l(t) + s(t)(1  l(t))  e(t) +
1Z
0
(dj(t) + _qj(t))sj(t)dj   na(t). (35)
where sj(t) the number of shares per capita in rm j held at time t by the family. A
share in rm j trades at price qj(t) and generates a dividend ow dj(t) at time t. Financial
wealth of the family is thus given by A(t) =
1Z
0
qj(t))N(t)sj(t)dj and then a(t)  A(t)N(t) .
Note that the revenues of this family accrue from total labor income because we as-
sume the family is so big that it considers all workers, employed and unemployed, Daveri
and Ma¤ezzoli (2000), Eriksson (1997) and Raurich, Sala and Sorolla (2006) also make
the big family assumption. If we have heterogeneous agents instead of a big family, the
solution does not change as long as we assume complete competitive insurance markets
for unemployment or that the union pursues a redistributive goal, acting as a substitute
for the insurance markets (Ma¤ezzoli (2001) and Benassy (1997)).
In market equilibrium we obtain (see Galí (1996)):
_c(t)
c(t)
=
1


1
m
FK(k(t); l(t))  (+ )

, (36)
_k(t) = f(k(t); l(t))  c(t)  (n+ )k(t). (37)
Where k(t) is capital per capita and F (k; l) is the production function per capita
(see appendix). Assuming a constant employment rate lt = l , that is what we obtain
with a Cobb-Douglas production function plus the wage equations in the rm, sector and
centralized wage setting systems, plus the assumption of the unemployment benet budget
constraint, these equations become:
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_c(t)
c(t)
=
1


1
m
FK(k(t); l
)  (+ )

, (38)
_k(t) = F (k(t); l)  ct   (n+ )k(t). (39)
Because l < 1, it is clear from (39) that the rate of growth of capital per capita is lower
for a given level of c and k in a model with unemployment, that is, employment a¤ects
growth in the short run. It is also clear, from (38) and (39), that consumption and capital
per capita converge to a steady state with a zero rate of growth of capital per capita and
consumption per capita. That means that there is no relationship between growth and
unemployment in the long run: the constant rate of unemployment is given by l and the
rate of growth in income per capita is zero, or x, if we introduce technological progress. It
is also easy to see, drawing the phase diagram, that a decrease in l decreases the long run
level of consumption, capital and income per capita, that is, there is a positive relationship
between income, capital and consumption per capita and employment in the long run. In
other words, all other parameters equal, economies with a higher employment rate will
record higher income, capital and consumption per capita in the long run.
On the other hand, the level of capital per worker and income per worker in the long
run does not depend on the employment rate because we can rewrite (38) as
_c(t)
c(t)
=
1


1
m
f(k^(t))  (+ )

, (40)
where k^ is capital per unit of labor and f(k^) the production function in intensive form,
and, hence, in the long run k^ is given by:
0 =
1


1
m
f(k^)  (+ )

. (41)
Then, all the other parameters remaining equal, we also have a U relationship between
long run income, capital and consumption per capita and the degree of centralization
of wage setting when the degree of market power in the product market is high enough
and there is no relationship between capital and income per worker and the degree of
centralization of wage setting.
Finally, as we saw, an increase in market power increases unemployment when the wage
is set at sector level, but has no e¤ect when it is set at rm and national level. However,
in all three systems it produces a decrease in long run income, capital and consumption
per capita and in capital and income per worker.
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9 Main Results
We the inverse U relationship between unemployment and the degree of centralization of
wage setting is to be expected in an economy where the product market is non competitive
when the degree of market power of this product market is high enough. This is due to
the higher labor demand elasticity at sector level because of considering market power at
this level. Note that this relationship occurs when all the other parameters do not change.
As a result, it is not surprising that if one checks for the inverse U hypothesis without
controlling for the other parameters that a¤ect the employment rate, the relationship does
not appear. We should also expect a U relationship between long run income, capital and
consumption per capita and the degree of centralization of wage setting when the degree
of market power in the product market is high enough and there is no relationship between
capital and income per worker and the degree of centralization of wage setting.
Finally an increase in market power increases unemployment when the wage is set at
sector level but has no e¤ect when it is set at rm and national level. However, in all three
systems it produces a decrease in long run income, capital and consumption per capita
and in capital and income per worker.
This paper o¤ers an explanation for the weak relationship between the wage bargaining
system and the employment rate that has been explicitly tested in a large number of
studies. As we saw in section 2, the empirical evidence reveals strong heterogeneity for
the parameters that determine the rate of unemployment in the theoretical model of this
paper for the sample of countries with a wage bargaining system at sector level. This
causes, even inside this group, the results on the unemployment to be very heterogeneous.
Another implication of the results presented is that it may be particularly relevant
for policy makers who plan to implement labor market reforms to reduce unemployment
to analyze the specic characteristics for every country of the variables that determine
the unemployment rate in the model, such as for example: social expenditure structure,
government e¢ ciency, etc.
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10.1 Appendix 1
We introduce the monopolistic competition set up in a growth model (Galí (1996)) hav-
ing j 2 [0; 1] sectors with one rm per sector that produces product Yj(t). Production
functions at sector and rm level are characterized by function
Yj(t) = F (Kj(t); Lj(t)), (42)
with constant returns to scale with respect to K and L, FK > 0, FL > 0, FKK < 0,
FLL < 0 and the Inada conditions: LimK!0FK =1, LimK!1FK = 0, LimL!0FL =1,
LimL!1FL = 0. The production function in terms of output per worker or unit of labor,
Yj(t)
Lj(t)
 y^j(t), and capital per worker or the capital labor ratio, Kj(t)Lj((t)  k^j(t), that is, in
intensive form, is:
y^j(t) = f(k^j(t)), (43)
where f 0 > 0 and f< 0.
Finally we also rewrite the production function in per capita terms Yj(t)
N(t)
 yj(t),
Kj(t)
N(t)
 kj(t), Lj(t)N(t)  lj(t), where N(t) is population a time t. In this case, we have:
yj(t)  Yj(t)
N(t)
= F (
Kj(t)
N(t)
;
Lj(t)
N(t)
)  F (kj(t); lj(t)), (44)
with Fk = FK and Fl = FL .
The stock of capital for rm j evolves according to the equation:
_Kj(t) = Ij(t)  Kj(t), (45)
where Ij(t) is a composite of the ow of purchases by rm j of the good produced by
rm h, Ij;h(t)24.
The rm in sector j maximizes the wealth of its shareholders subject to the demand
function. The demand function in sector j is the sum of the demands of consumers and
rms (Galí (1996) equation (2.7)):
Yj(t) =

Pj(t)
P (t)
  
E(t)
P (t)

+

Pj(t)
(t)
  
Z(t)
(t)

, (46)
where P (t) is the aggregate price index P (t) 
0@ 1Z
0
Pj(t)
1 dj
1A
1
1 
, E(t) is the ow of
24As dened below Ij(t)  Zj(t)(t) .
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expenditure in consumption goodsE(t) 
1Z
0
Pj(t)Cj(t)dj, Z(t) is the ow of expenditure in
investment goods, Z(t) 
1Z
0
Zj(t)dj, that is the sum for all sectors of expenditures in Ij(t),
Zj(t) 
1Z
0
Ph(t)Ij;h(t)dh, (t) is the aggregate price index (t) 
0@ 1Z
0
Pj(t)
1 dj
1A
1
1 
and
 and  are the constant price elasticity of the consumer and rms demand functions.
Finally,  > 1 denotes the (exogenously given) elasticity of substitution between di¤erent
goods form the viewpoint of the rm which uses them as inputs (Galí (1996), P.255).
Assuming that the price elasticity of the demands of consumers and rms is equal to 25
, equation (46) becomes.
Yj(t) =

Pj(t)
P (t)
  
E(t)
P (t)

+

Pj(t)
P (t)
  
Z(t)
P (t)

=

Pj(t)
P (t)
  
E(t) + Z(t)
P (t)

(47)
=

Pj(t)
P (t)
  
Y (t)
P (t)

=

Pj(t)
P (t)
   
Y(t)

where Y (t)  E(t) + Z(t) and Y(t)  Y (t)
P (t)
is total real expenditures on consumption and
investment. The aggregate price index is now P (t) 
0@ 1Z
0
Pj(t)
1 dj
1A
1
1 
.
Dening m  1
(1  1

)
> 1, as the monopoly degree or the markup, from the solution to
the program of the rm, we obtain the following rst order condition for rm j (see again
Galí (1996), equation 2.11) with the payroll taxes properly added:
FL(Kj(t); Lj(t)) = (1 + 
f )m
Wj(t)
Pj(t)
; (48)
and then
FL(Kj(t); Lj(t)) = (1 + 
f )m
Wj(t)
P (t)
Pj(t)
P (t)
= (1 +  f )m!j(t)
Yj(t)
1

Y(t)
1

(49)
= (1 +  f )m!j(t)
F (Kj(t); Lj(t))
1

Y(t)
1

25The complication of the monopolistic competition set up in a growth model arises from the fact that
both consumers and rms demand product i due to the demand of capital of each rm. On principle the
price elasticity of both types of demand may be di¤erent, this is the point of Galis paper, and this opens
the door for multiplicity of equilibria. The assumption that  is constant is the  =  case in Gali´s
paper.
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where !j(t)  Wj(t)P (t) is the real wage in sector j. We can rewrite equation (49) as:
FL(Kj(t); Lj(t))F (Kj(t); Lj(t))
  1
 =
(1 +  f )m!j(t)
Y(t)
1

(50)
and from the last equation26 we get the"labor demand" function for sector j:
Ldj (t) = ~Lj((1 + 
f )m!j(t); Kj(t); Y(t)), (51)
where ~Lj;m!j < 0 and ~Lj;Y > 0:
Because FL(Kj(t); Lj(t)) = f(k^j(t)) k^j(t)f 0(k^j(t)), equation (49) can also be rewritten
in terms of the production function in intensive form as:
f(k^j(t))  k^j(t)f 0(k^j(t)) = mWj(t)
Pj(t)
, (52)
which gives the capital labor ratio function:
k^j(t) = ~k

m
Wj(t)
Pj(t)

, (53)
with ~k0 > 0.
26We can also rewrite this condition in terms of the capital labor ratio as:
h
f(k^j)  k^jf 0(k^j)
i
f(k^j)
  1 =
m!j
( YL )
1

.
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